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The Use of Coerced Confessions in State Courts
I. A. Spanogle*
In this article Professor Spanogle examines the Supreme Court de-
cisions in cases involving coerced confessions. He shows that the under-
lying basis of these decisions is not, as has been supposed, an attempt
to protect accused persons from "outrageous" police conduct, but instead
the principle that an accused has a right to refuse to disclose his guilt
to police interrogators. The application of this principle, he says, calls
for a subjective test, looking to the state of the accused's mind at the
time the confession was made. He concludes by pointing out the state
courts' failure to go beyond mere "color-matching" of factual situations,
suggesting that this failure is possibly the result of the previously
unclear definition of the basic principles involved.
It is now well settled that involuntary confessions must be
excluded from evidence in all criminal trials in state courts. It has
been difficult, however, to distinguish a voluntary confession from
an involuntary one, because the term "involuntary" is not well defined.
This lack of definition, which creates great problems for state trial and
appellate courts in attempting to apply the rule to individual cases,
has, in turn, stemmed from a lack of understanding of the reasons for
excluding involuntary confessions. The United States Supreme Court
has handed down thirty-four coerced confession cases, holding con-
fessions admissible in some factual situations and inadmissible in
others. The difficulties encountered by the state courts in defining
"involuntary" have not been due to inconsistent decisions by the
Court in individual cases, but rather to the absence of any clearly
enunciated explanation of the purpose the Court seeks to achieve, or
of the interests it seeks to protect, by excluding such evidence.' The
failure of the state courts to understand the underlying rationale has
led many of them to attempt to color-match case fact situations, or to
turn the whole matter over to the jury with the most general of
instructions. 2 It has even led to calls to abandon the "involuntary"
terminology as incapable of explaining the Court's present standard.3
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. "Indeed, it seems fair to say that the whole modem history of the confession rule
both in and out of the federal Supreme Court has been characterized by ambiguity as
to what purposes the rule is intended to achieve and what interests it is designed to
protect." Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L.
R . 16, 18 (1953).
2. See notes 160-62 infra.
3. "However, so long as future opinions continue to discuss the confessions problem
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This article seeks to formulate a usable definition of "involuntary."
Any discussion of the problems regarding involuntary confessions
must, however, start with an examination of the reasons for excluding
such evidence. Therefore this article will reexamine the rationale
which has been previously accepted: that the Court is attempting to
protect accused persons from "outrageous" police conduct. It will
indicate how this test, which requires that police methods be judged
objectively, fails to explain recent confession cases. It will then re-
examine the Court's decisions to find their underlying reasoning and
will use this reasoning to show that the Court is primarily interested
in protecting the right4 of the accused to refuse to disclose his guilt
to a police interrogator. This examination will also show that the
Court's present test is based on determining the defendant's probable
state of mind at the time he confessed. The state of mind which
requires exclusion of a confession will be the basis for a definition of
"involuntary." If the accused's will to remain silent is overborne,
because he thinks that further resistance to the interrogator's demands
for a confession will be unavailing, the resulting confession is termed
"involuntary." The article will also discuss briefly criteria and methods
of analysis to be used in applying this definition of "involuntary,"
and will compare recent state court decisions with these criteria and
methods.
I. Tim PROBLEM
Confessions which were deemed involuntary were excluded from
evidence at common law.5 Wigmore argued that the only justification
for excluding a confession from evidence was a finding that it was
"untrustworthy as testimony."6 According to traditional evidence
theories, an untrustworthy confession would be inadmissible because
it was incompetent.7 However, such a theory also meant that only
untrustworthy confessions could be termed involuntary, and that a
confession would be excluded only if the interrogation tactics used
solely in terms of voluntariness, they will shed no more light on what has been done
or what is to be expected than have past opinions." Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Third Degree, 6 STAx. L. REv. 411, 429 (1954).
4. See text at notes 56 & 58 infra.
5. The King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
6. "The principle, then, upon which a confession may be excluded is that it is, under
certain conditions, testimonially untrustworthy .... [T]he essential feature is that the
principle of exclusion is a testimonial one, analogous to the other principles which
exclude narrations as untrustworthy." 3 Wicmosm, EVIDENCE § 822, at 246 (3d ed.
1940). "A confession is not excluded because of any illegality in the method of obtain-
ing it ...." Id. § 823, at 249. "[Tihe confession-rule aims to exclude self-criminating
statements which are false . Id. § 823, at 250.
7. Id. §§ 822-26.
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were sufficiently coercive to induce a false self-accusation."
However, in 1936 it became clear that the common law theory was
not the only moving force in this area. The United States Supreme
Court held that the due process requirement of a fair trial would
also regulate a state's use of confession evidence.9 Its first two de-
cisions10 could easily be squared with the common law untrustworthi-
ness rationale, and no contrary rationale was suggested. But in 1941
it began to appear that untrustworthiness was not the only basis for a
due process objection to the use of a coerced confession as evidence
and therefore was not the sole rationale for the exclusionary rule.
In Lisenba v. California" the Court stated that: "The aim of the
requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence, whether true or false."'2
In adding the prohibition against fundamental unfairness, the Court
did not indicate what other considerations it found relevant to due
process, nor what interests of the accused, other than the exclusion of
false evidence, were to be protected against "unfairness"-it did not
indicate how the common law definition of "involuntary" might be
changed. It was obvious, however, that something in addition to
untrustworthiness was important to the Court in considering confes-
sion evidence, and that an accused had some right under due process
which extended further than the mere right not to have a false
confession forced from his lips.13 This right was sufficiently important
to exclude evidence which was otherwise both relevant and com-
petent. In other words, the Court had at least indicated that even
a "guilty" accused person could claim some due process protection
in confession cases. The question still remained: From what was he
to be protected?
While the rationale of the due process protection was thus unde-
fined, two things happened. First, in 1943 the Court held, in McNabb
v. United States, 4 that in federal criminal trials confessions were to
8. Ibid. Inconsistent with such a theory, but not rejecting it, are the cases which
excluded a coerced confession even though fruits of that confession had substantiated
it. See 3 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 858, and cases cited therein.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, supra note 9.
11. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
12. Id. at 236. (Emphasis added.)
13. This development may not have been obvious from the language in Lisenba.
Confirmation was not long in coming, however. In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949), the Court held that a confession could be inadmissible even though its validity
was substantiated by its fruits. And in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), it
was held that if the probable truthfulness of a confession was the sole criterion taken
into consideration in determining its voluntariness any resulting conviction must be
reversed.
14. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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be excluded if they had been obtained during a period of illegal
detention. It was thought that one basis for this rule was to exert
disciplinary control over federal officers to prevent "lawless law en-
forcement" by providing an indirect sanction against such conduct.1"
Second, the Court began deciding many state confession cases with-
out explicitly examining the effect of the interrogation methods used
on the particular defendant. Thus, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee," decided
a year after McNabb, thirty-six hours of continuous questioning was
held "inherently coercive," in spite of evidence that the defendant
had recovered from the effects of his interrogation at the time he
confessed.1 7 Subsequent cases also reversed convictions based upon
confessory evidence without determining whether the interrogation
methods used had compelled the defendant to make the confession. 18
This abandonment of a search for a causal connection between
police methods and the accused's act of confessing was thought to
indicate that the effect of such methods on the accused was no longer
important. Thus, most commentators concluded that the due process
addition to the common law trustworthiness standard was an "objec-
tive" test, in which the conduct of the police was to be judged
against some ideal or "civilized" standard, rather than a "subjective"
test which considered the effect of such conduct on the accused
and his probable powers of resistance.19 (In this article, as has been
15. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
REv. 442 (1948). Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958), suggests that the primary rationale is different. This
does not, however, change the fact that the commentators believed that the Court's
primary purpose was the exertion of such disciplinary control. Nor does it mean that
it was not at least an incidental purpose.
16. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
17. Id. at 156, 165-67 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
19. The subjective-objective analysis became the standard tool for attacking state
confession problems, and seems to have remained so. See, e.g., Ritz, Twenty-five Years
of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U. S. Supreme Court, 19 WAsH. & LI.E L.
REv. 35 (1962); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View,
in POLICE Powzn AND INDnVIuAL FREEDOm (Sowle ed. 1962); Inbau, Restrictions in
the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 77 (1957); Leibowitz,
Safeguards in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. RFv. 86 (1957);
Maguire, Involuntary Confessions, 31 TuL. L. REv. 125 (1956); Paulsen, supra note 3;
Allen, supra note 1; and Notes, 46 IowA L. Rnv. 388 (1961); 26 TENN. L. Rnv. 291
(1959); and 37 B.U.L. REv. 374 (1957). This analysis has been used by authors who
seek more protection for the accused, as well as by those who seek to rcduce dis-
ciplinary control by the courts over the police. See Leibowitz, supra; Weisberg, supra.
One author has noted, however, that the traditional subjective-objective dichotomy
has not been used since Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), and that the cases
decided after 1953 reflect the use of a new kind of test. Comment, 50 J. CaIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 265, 271 (1959).
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done in other articles in the field,20 I shall use "objective" to refer to
tests which judge the offensiveness of the police conduct without
regard to its effect on the accused. I shall use "subjective" to refer
to tests which relate to either the actual or the probable state of mind
of the accused at the time he confesses. Even those "subjective" tests
which consider probable states of mind are still primarily concerned
with the effect of the interrogation on the accused and his probable
ability to resist the interrogator. Thus, "subjective," as used in this
field, does not necessarily correspond to its usage in other fields. For
example, the common law trustworthiness test has traditionally been
so termed even though it considers the probable, not the actual,
effect of the interrogation on the accused.21)
Further, the Court's use of "inherently coercive" appeared to
indicate that certain state police methods would be presumed "unfair,"
just as the McNabb decision had held illegal detention of an arrestee
by federal officers to be "uncivilized."22 It was therefore assumed that
an analogous rationale underlay the due process contribution to the
coerced confession rule, and that the Court was attempting to exert
disciplinary control over the state police as it had supposedly exerted
such control over the federal police in McNabb.2 Both state and
federal police would be required to use "civilized standards." If the
federal police could not obtain an admissible confession by violat-
ing federal statutory law, the state police could not violate due
process and use the resulting confession.
The commentators24 therefore concluded that an accused had two
due process rights during police interrogation: (1) a right not to
have a false confession used at his trial-the common law standard;
and (2) a right not to be subjected to police conduct which itself
violated due process. Only when the methods used by the police were"outrageous" or "uncivilized" were they said to violate due process.
A confession should be expressly tested by two standards, "trustworthiness"
and "police methods," and the standards should be applied independently
of one another. If the danger of falsity is too great, or if the methods
employed too outrageous, the conviction should be reversed.5
This theory is still the prevailing one today despite the express
language of the Court to the contrary.
20. See articles cited in note 19 supra.
21. See text at note 45 infra.
22. 318 U.S. at 340.
23. See especially Inbau, supra note 14; Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959
WAsir. U.L.Q. 103, 113-14 (1959).
24. See authorities cited note 19 supra Although the commentators reached this
conclusion, thq court itself does not seem to have adopted it. See note 59 infra.
25. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 431. See also, Ritz, supra note 19, at 57.
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The conclusion to be drawn is that while the Court still couches its opinions
in terms of a factual inquiry into the state of the defendant's mind at the
time of confessing, the Court has actually abandoned this approach. The
Court is more concerned with the nature of the methods used by the police
at the time the confession was obtained than with the effect those methods
had on the particular individual.26
In the theory of the latter standard (hereinafter called the objective
standard), the interest to be protected was the individual's interest
in not being subjected to uncivilized police conduct, not his interest
in excluding any statements procured by such conduct. Confession
evidence was to be excluded primarily to deter the police from
engaging in offensive conduct, not to protect any right of the
individual in regard to the use of such evidence at his trial. Under
this theory, the Court was exercising disciplinary control over the
state police, not protecting the fair trial rights of the individual
accused. Once the accused's rights had been divided and isolated in
this manner, analysis of the problems in this area concentrated on
the constitutionality, propriety, and usefulness of the Court's exercise
of disciplinary control over state police.27
It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that neither the
common law standard nor the objective standard explains the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in the majority of recent state coerced
confession cases. First, the Court's language indicates that it believes
it is protecting some fair trial right of the individual defendant, rather
than generally supervising the various state police. It would therefore
seem more relevant to ascertain what right of the accused is being
protected than to discuss the supposed lack of constitutional founda-
tion, etc., for supervision of state police. Second, the most recent de-
cisions of the Court cannot be explained as attempts either to exclude
false evidence or to discipline the state police, for neither does the
evidence appear false nor was the police conduct uncivilized. Thus,
the common law and objective standards do not seem to furnish an
accurate definition of "involuntary," as that term is presently used by
the Court.
Yet the state courts need a definition which is accurate and
somewhat definite. State court use is the ultimate test of any legal
theories in this area. Otherwise, the Court's standard will be 'ap-
plied only in those few cases which the Court itself can review.
The failure of the Court to make itself understood is vividly shown
by the surprise of a Pennsylvania Superior Court upon discovering, in
1962, that the common law untrustworthiness standard was instffi-
26. Ritz, supra note 19, at 42-43.
27. An example of a debate on such problems is shown in the exchange between
Inbau, supra note 19, and Leibowitz, supra note 19. See also Ritz, supra note 19.
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cient . 8 But the state courts which have followed the objective
standard have fared little better. Some have been led on a wild
goose chase, attempting to color-match case factual situations; others
have resorted to formulating a list of prohibited police practices, the
presence of which invalidates a confession, but whose absence auto-
matically makes a confession admissible.2 Thus, the Court's decisions
should be reexamined to see whether it is endeavoring to protect
rights and interests other than those protected by the common law
and objective standards, and, if so, to see how this may change the
definition of "involuntary." 30
II. A Dr miENT RATINALE AS A SOLUTION
The first question to be answered is: How has the objective
standard been insufficient to explain the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions? Only then can we answer the question: What standard
is the Court using? The insufficiency of the objective standard is
shown by examination of the results of some cases, of the types of
evidence which the Court considers important, of the language used
by the Court to explain its holdings, and even of the common usage
meaning of the word "involuntary."
A primary example of the inability of the objective standard to
explain the results of the Court's decisions is Gallegos v. Colorado.31
There, a fourteen-year-old boy admitted, immediately after he was
arrested, that he had committed an assault and robbery. He was
then placed in a state juvenile hall, without being taken before a
magistrate, and was detained there in semi-isolation for five days.32
At the end of that time he signed a second and formal confession
which was used at his trial.33 There was no prolonged questioning of
28. Commonwealth v. Williams, 197 Pa. Super. 184, 176 A.2d 911 (1962). This
decision was handed down after the Supreme Court decisions in Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961), and Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
29. See text accompanying notes 165 & 171-72 infra.
30. For instance, a comparable problem arises in contract law in determining the
presence of duress. Duress is usually said to be present if one party's consent was
coerced or involuntary. Yet, "the test of what act or threat produces the required
degree of fear is not objective." BSTA-rTmENT, CoNTRACTS § 492, Comment a (1932).
See also authorities cited in notes 125 & 151 infra.
31. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). [Hereinafter referred to simply as the Gallegos case, to
be distinguished from Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951)].
32. Defendant was kept apart from other inmates in a separate "unit," except
for meals. - He was kept out of the institution's school and recreational programs.
Within his isolation unit, he had access to any other inmates who had also just
arrived, and who were also being kept out of the programs. Normally, this semi-
isolation lasted only twenty-four hours, but persons charged with serious offenses, such
as assault, might remain in it longer. Record, pp. 272-75, Gallegos v. Colorado, supra
note 31.
33. After defendant made the written second confession, the victim of the assault
died; defendant was then charged with murder rather than robbery. 370 U.S. at 50.
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the defendant, but his mother was not allowed to see him. The Court
held that his written, second confession had been coerced, and that
its use at his trial violated his right to due process. There was no
question as to the trustworthiness of the confession, and the Court did
not bother to discuss the point.- The decision was therefore not
based upon an application of the common law standard, but must
rest upon whatever due process standard the Court has added.
The objective standard would exclude this confession only if it
could be said that the methods used by the police violated due
process. Under the normal formulation of the rule, the methods
themselves must be sufficiently "outrageous" or "uncivilized"35 as to
offend due process before the police are to be disciplined by excluding
the confession. Yet the Court did not term the treatment of the
boy as either outrageous or uncivilized, and it would be hard to use
such epithets without a wholesale denunciation of the Colorado
Juvenile Halls.3 Thus, it is apparent that the Court is requiring the
state police to adhere to a higher standard than the objective stand-
ard, as normally formulated, would require.
Even if the objective standard is revised to require exclusion of
confessions whenever there is any violation of any preferred proce-
dural standards (asserted by some to be constitutional rights), it would
not explain the result in this case. The Court stated that there was no
prolonged questioning of the defendant, nor were other third degree
methods involved. Defendant was warned of his right to remain silent
and to have the advice of counsel or his parents. The defendant was
detained before appearing before a magistrate, and the coerced second
confession was procured during this detention. Also, the defendant
was not furnished an attorney and was cut off from other adult ad-
visors. Thus, the only violations of preferred procedural standards
34. The prosecution argued a variant of this theme, stating that the detention was
irrelevant because the allegedly coerced confession was substantially the same as the
oral first confession, which had been made at arrest and before any detention. Com-
pare United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). The Court stated that such an
argument was "in callous disregard of this boy's constitutional rights," and dismissed
it without further discussion. 370 U.S. at 54.
35. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 431. Both the concept of the objective standard and
the term "outrageous" seem to be derived from the "shock the conscience" test of
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). This would seem further reason to
question their present validity. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The term "uncivilized" is derived from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 340,
and the assumption made that if the federal police must be civilized, so also must the
state police.
36. The superintendent of the particular juvenile hall testified that defendant was
treated no differently than any other boy. Record, p. 274, Gallegos v. Colorado, supra
note 31. This would eliminate any possibility that the police detained the defendant
for the purpose of obtaining a confession, thus making an allegation of uncivilized police
conduct even more difficult to sustain.
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which the defendant could claim were that he was illegally 37 detained
and that he was not furnished counsel during that detention. But the
Court has not yet declared that every confession made during an il-
legal detention is inadmissible.3 Nor has it stated that every confes-
sion made while a defense attorney is not present has been coerced.3
Nor was Gallegos decided on either basis.4° Even in the latest confes-
sion case, subsequent to Gallegos, the Court said only that these viola-
tions were "attendant circumstances" which must be considered in
determining voluntariness.4'
Thus, neither the normal formulation of the objective standard,
nor any modification of that standard, is able to explain the result of
this case. And the reason for this inability points up the most serious
defect in any analysis based upon the objective standard. In any
such analysis we are forced to ignore that fact which the Court
considered to be the most important to the case-the youth of the
defendant. The objective standard, by its own definitions2 does
not depend upon the effect of the interrogation upon the individual
accused, but only upon the relationship between the police conduct
and due process rights-the type of person being interrogated and
his ability to resist police interrogation pressure are irrelevant.
37. It is possible that his detention was not illegal since its legality was never
challenged by the defense attorney. However, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-7 (1953)
requires that any juvenile arrested with or without a warrant be brought "directly"
before a county or juvenile court, rather than a police magistrate. No time limit for
this appearance is specified, but the "directly" requirement should preclude side-trips
for interrogation. CoLo. rEv. STAT. ANr. § 39-2-3 (1953), the general statute on
commitment of arrestees, sets no requirements as to when an arrestee is to be brought
before a magistrate.
38. In both Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), and Culornbe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961), the Court expressly stated that it would not so rule. See Part
I B infra.
39. See the dissenting opinions in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and
Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). In each case, the argument that due process
requires the presence of counsel during interrogation, at least when counsel is de-
manded, was rejected. See also text accompanying note 109 infra.
40. The four dissenters in Crooker v. California, supra note 39, formed the majority
in Gallegos v. Colorado, supra note 31, but were careful not to mention either Crooker
or Cicenia v. LaGay, supra note 39. Instead of emphasizing the absence of an
attorney, the Court emphasized the youth of the defendant and the lack of "adult
advice" in general. 370 U.S. at 54. Further, in summing up its reason for reversal, the
Court cited the totality of the circumstances, and took care not to say that any one
circumstance would have required a reversal: "The youth of the petitioner, the long
detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him
before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice
of a lawyer or a friend-all these combine to make us conclude that the formal confession
on which this conviction may have rested was obtained in violation of due process."
Id. at 55. Cf. King, Developing a Future Constitutional Standard for Confessions, 8
WAYNE L. REv. 481 (1962); Note, 76 Haav. L. REv. 108 (1962).
41. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517 (1963).
42. See Ritz, supra note 19, especially at 43-51; and Paulsen, supra note 3.
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However, it is apparent that these factors not only are relevant, but
are quite important, to the Court. In Gallegos the fact that the
defendant was a fourteen-year-old boy was necessary to the decision
that his confession was involuntary. The Court indicated that similar
treatment of an adult would not have produced an involuntary confes-
sion.4 3 In many other cases the Court has made distinctions between
types of defendants. Thus youths, members of minority races, the
uneducated, the insane, and the inexperienced in crime have been
granted special protection, and the Court has applied different and
more rigorous standards to determine the admissibility of confessions
made by these types of defendants.44 Under the objective standard,
none of these facts would have been considered. Since these factors
are important to the Court, it is apparent that the Court is using
some form of subjective test-a test which depends upon the effect
of the interrogation methods on the accused, which effects may vary
with different types of individuals. Thus, the Court, in deciding
confession cases, is searching for the state of mind of the defendant
during the interrogation and at the time he confessed.
Yet, as the commentators have correctly pointed out,45 the Court
is not concerned with the actual reaction of the particular individual
in the case before it. Instead, the Court is in effect creating presump-
tions as to the breaking point of different types of people.46 The Court
must operate in this way, because it cannot determine the defendant's
actual state of mind. The accused can always say he confessed only
because he was scared, etc.417 On the other hand, the state can claim
43. "He (the defendant) cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of
his sense and knowledgable of the consequences of his admissions." 370 U.S. at 54.
"Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year old boy would not
be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To allow this
conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional
rights." Id. at 54-55.
44. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (woman, inexperienced in crime);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (mentally retarded); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (insane Negro); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959) (ignorant Italian immigrant); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (illiter-
ate nineteen-year-old Negro); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (illiterate
Negro); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (illiterate Negro); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (fifteen-year-old Negro); White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631,
reversing 128 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939) (illiterate Negro). Cf. Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (illiterate Mexican).
45. See note 19 supra.
46. Technically, this does not seem to be an inference, because it is not possible
to deduce the accused's state of mind by logical rules. See MoRGAN, BAsic PnonLES
OF EvIDENcE 31 (1961). Nor has the Court endeavored to use rigorous logic. Whether
the presumptions are conclusive or rebuttable has not yet been tested. But see the
discussion of Ashcraft in the text accompanying note 17 supra.
47. E.g., Testimony of Robert Gallegos:
Q. "[W]hat was the reason you gave those answers [confessions]?"
A. "I was scared that if we didn't do it they would keep us in security longer."
[VoL. 17
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that the jury rejected this testimony when it returned a guilty ver-
dict.48 Thus, the Court must discover this state of mind from the
objective facts concerning the defendant's treatment, rather than
from his self-serving declarations. This means creating a standard
based on the probable effect of specified interrogation techniques on
the mind of a particular type of defendant. There is nothing new
in such a procedure. It was used at common law to determine the
trustworthiness of a confession (which has always been termed a
subjective standard, because it considers the accused's probable state
of mind). 49 As Wigmore stated: "It must be remembered that no
attempt is ever made to investigate the actual motives of the person
confessing, or the part played by the inducement among other
motives. The whole theory of inducements rests on the probable
effect, not the actual effect, upon the person."50 Thus the Supreme
Court can use a subjective standard without investigating the individ-
ual defendant's actual reactions to the interrogation techniques used.
It can instead determine a presumptive state of mind from the objec-
tive facts concerning the length, etc., of the interrogation. And, as
long as the Court is using a subjective standard, analysis under an
objective standard will be unable to define "involuntary" correctly.
If the Court is concerned with the effect of an interrogation on
the accused, the question still remains: What is an impermissible
effect on him? Another way to ask the same question is: What
interest of an interrogated person is of sufficient constitutional value
to warrant protecting it by excluding any confession procured by an
Record, p. 164, Gallegos v. Colorado, supra note 31.
Q. "And did you sign it Robert?" A. "Yes, sir, I signed it because he said
whether we told the truth or didn't tell the truth he was going to send us
to the Industrial School." Id. at 163.
48. The Court limits itself to examining "undisputed facts." Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). This is because it is reviewing a finding of fact. Pre-
sumably, it would be possible for the Court to say that any such declaration is
undisputed in that the interrogators did not state that the defendant did not look
scared, or even if they did, they could not know he was not scared. Compare Haynes v.
Washington, supra note 41, at 507-13 (1963), with Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note
44. Any such line of reasoning would, of course, be impractical because any false
claim of coercion, no matter how obviously unfounded, would require exclusion of the
confession. The Court must therefore regard such declarations not only as disputed,
but also as rejected by the jury.
This does not mean, however, that the Court may not review the issue of voluntari-
ness of confessions. Cf. Ritz, supra note 19, at 51-66. "In this sense the Court is not
deciding the fact of voluntariness; it is applying a constitutional standard of probability."
Paulsen, supra note 3, at 434.
49. See text following note 20 supra and authorities cited at note 19 supra.
50. 3 WIG ORE, EVIDENCE § 853, at 333 (3d ed. 1940). See also Culombe v.
Connecticut, supra note 44, at 603; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra note 16. In Ashcraft
both the majority and the dissent agreed that proof of the actual effect of the interroga-
tion on the defendant was not necessary. Id. at 154, 160. And see MAGUIRE,
EvmENcE OF GUmT 127, 134 (1959).
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interrogation which violates that interest? The most obvious place to
look for an answer to such questions is the language the Court has
used to explain its decisions in the confession cases. This language
has not always been clear,-5 but it may provide sufficient clues.
The Court has usually stated that it was searching for a state of
mind. A typical formulation of the type of state of mind which the
Court feels is determinative is found in Lyons v. Oklahoma: "The
voluntary or involuntary character of a confession is determined by
a conclusion as to whether the accused, at the time he confesses, is
in possession of 'mental freedom' to confess or to deny a suspected
participation in a crime." 2 And in Reck v. Pate: "The question
in each case is whether a defendant's will was overborne at the time
he confessed."5 This language was thought to relate only to the
trustworthiness standard and therefore was interpreted to mean that
"voluntariness" depends upon whether the circumstances were such
that the defendant was compelled to make an untrue confession.
Thus, "mental freedom to confess or not" has been equated with
"mental freedom to make a true confession or not." 4 Through this
reasoning the above language has been thought to concern only the
common law untrustworthiness standard. But such an interpretation
is not required. The language is at least equally susceptible to the
interpretation that a confession is "involuntary" if the accused's will
not to give any confession, true or false, but to remain silent or lie,
is overborne.
This type of language has also been used in situations where the
veracity of the confession was not in issue. In Watts 1. Indiana,"5
the confession was substantiated by its fruits but was still held
inadmissible. The Court stated that the type of interrogation implied
"that it is better for the prisoner to answer" (not: to answer falsely)
"than to persist in the refusal of disclosure which is his constitutional
right."56 This was because a confession (not: a false confession)
"could not be extorted in open court."57 Thus the Court has stated that
it is protecting an interest of the individual accused in not having to
answer a police interrogator at all, rather than a more limited interest
in not having to answer with a false self-accusation. It has protected
51. See note 1 supra.
52. 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
53. 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961). Lynumn v. Illinois, supra note 44; Haynes v. Wash-
ington, supra note 41. "[Tlhe concept of voluntariness is one which concerns the mental
state, there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal 'psychological'
fact." Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 44, at 603.
54. See, e.g., Ritz, supra note 19, at 41-42, quoted in text at note 26 supra.
55. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).




this interest by giving the accused a "constitutional right
' 58 to "re-
fuse to disclose" his guilt.5 The similarity of this right to remain silent
to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is obvious.
One was devised to protect against the ancient abuse of judicial in-
quisition, the other against the modem abuse of police interrogation.
The Court itself has expressly made such a comparison. In Gal-
legos v. Colorado6O the Court stated that there are two due process
requirements which influence the determination of confession cases.
The first requirement is that the defendant be given a fair trial, free
from the use of constitutionally objectionable evidence. The second
requirement, which defines the type of evidence which is objectionable
in confession cases, is that the defendant be free from "the element
of compulsion which is condemned by the Fifth Amendment."
61 The
latter requirement must mean that the defendant possess not only the
mental freedom to confess or deny participation in a crime truthfully,
but also that he be free to confess, or lie, or stand mute if he desires,
whether guilty or not.
62
58. It is not sufficient to state that no such constitutional right is needed because
the police are not entitled to answers to their questions. Weisberg, supra note 19, at
161. Although the police have no legal power to compel testimony, they do at times
have, or appear to have, the physical power to do so. Thus, a right to refuse to disclose
guilt is needed to protect the accused against use of testimony compelled by this physi-
cal power. Any lesser protection would be a mere form of words, especially in view of
the general failure to warn the accused that he need not answer questions.
59. This conclusion does not ignore the fact that in some cases the Court has used
language indicating that there are other objectives which are furthered by excluding
involuntary confessions. E.g., "The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary con-
fessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in
the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to con-
vict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." Spano v.
New York, supra note 44, at 320-21; Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note 44, at 207.
However, this objective should be regarded as only an incidental benefit of the
exclusion of the confession. When the final determination of each case was made, the
Court clearly based this determination on the defendant's state of mind. "We conclude
that petitioner's will was overborne." Spano v. New York, supra note 44, at 323.
"ITIhe effect of such massive official interrogation must have been felt." Id. at 322.
"[T]he evidence here clearly establishes that the confession most probably was not
the product of any meaningful act of volition." Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note 44,
at 211. See also note 62 infra.
60. Supra note 30.
61. Id. at 51.
62. This also must be the point of Mr. Justice Frankffurter's oft-expressed com-
parison of the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems. See Watts v. Indiana, supra note
55; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). He is not speaking of the
inquisition of the middle ages, but of the modem French practices. For a discussion
of the "inquisitorial system" he cites Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime
in France, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 692 (1940). Further, the system cited allows judicial
interrogation, but only by a disinterested judge in the presence of counsel. Watts v.
Indiana, supra note 55, at 55. It would seem both systems attempt to eliminate
false confessions and "uncivilized" police conduct. Keedy, supra. Thus Frankfurter
is advocating neither the trustworthiness standard nor the objective standard.
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An involuntary confession may, therefore, be defined as one which
has been procured from an accused by overcoming his will to remain
silent or to deny guilt. Use of such a confession in a state criminal
trial violates the above combination of his federal constitutional rights,
and requires reversal of any conviction so obtained. First, reversal is
required because the use of constitutionally objectionable evidence
violates his right to a fair trial. Second, the confession is constitution-
ally objectionable because it has been obtained in violation of his
right to refuse to disclose guilt. This right of nondisclosure is a due
process right which is analogous to, but not dependent upon, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. This means that even
though the policies behind the two rights are similar, the authority for
and content of each right is different.6
The analogy between the definition of "involuntary" and the fith
amendment is not a recent legal development. It was stated by the
Supreme Court as long ago as 1897, in Brain v. United States. 64 Brain
involved a federal prosecution but was decided long before the im-
position of the McNabb rule, at a time when confessions used in fed-
eral trials were excluded solely for involuntariness. The Court's
definition of involuntariness in that case was:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue
is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment ... commanding that
But an essential difference between the two systems is the inclusion of the fifth
amendment privilege in the accusatorial system. This is the only meaningful inter-
pretation of the phrases: "Under our system, society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused not out of his own mouth." Watts v. Indiana, supra note
55, at 54. "It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under
judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through skillful investiga-
tion." Ibid. And see also: "The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the
circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing."
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185
(1953).
63. Even the McNaughton revision of Wigmore admits that the principles behind
the two rules are the same. 8 WisoE, EvmEcE § 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
64. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). The idea is not a new one to commentators,
especially evidence professors. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE 154-57 (1954); MoRGAN,
BASIC PnOBLEMS OF EviDENcE 129-31 (1st ed. 1954); McCormick, The Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 446, 451-54 (1938); Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 27-30 (1949). Nor is
this idea new to state courts. See Abston v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 416, 141 S.W.2d
337 (1940); cases cited in Morgan, supra, at 28 n.104. The principle is also recog-
nized in the state court cases which allow involuntary confessions to be used to
impeach the defendant's testimony as a witness. The rationale of such cases is that
the defendant has waived his privilege against self-incrimination by taking the witness
stand. See cases cited in Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478, 492-95 (1963). Such a rule would
be of questionable validity under the analogy suggested herein, because waiver rules
would not necessarily be applicable to fair trial rights. See note 69 infra. See also
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting); In re
Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J., concurring).
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no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.'65
When the Court began to require the exclusion of involuntary con-
fessions from state criminal trials, it would seem reasonable to believe
that this definition of "involuntary" was made applicable to confessions
used in state trials also.
The Court's use of the fifth amendment analogy does not in any way
imply that the amendment now applies to the states. Direct applica-
tion of the fifth amendment to exclude involuntary confessions would
not be necessary or feasible or helpful. The Court is merely refusing
to allow police officers of the states to question an accused secretly
and at great length without judicially administered supervision and
safeguards. This says nothing about the ability of a state to withdraw
the privilege against self-incrimination and still allow judicial interro-
gation with all of its safeguards. Thus, it is not necessary to overrule
Twining v. New Jersey66 or Adamson v. California,67 and the Court so
stated in Gallegos.68 Nor would such a direct application of the fifth
amendment enhance the protection of the accused's right to refuse to
disclose his guilt because of that amendments technical limitations,
especially the waiver doctrine, which can apply without a warning.69
Use of an analysis based on the right to refuse to disclose solves
many of the problems created by analysis under the objective
standard. First, it explains the results reached by the Court. It estab-
lishes a stricter standard than merely requiring the police to refrain
from outrageous or uncivilized conduct. Less forceful interrogation
techniques may coerce an accused to break his silence or admit he has
been lying.70 On the other hand, not every violation of a preferred
65. Ibid.
66. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
67. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
68. "But the question of the right of the state to withdraw the privilege against
self-incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted state-
ments refer is that of the processes of justice by which the accused may be called
as a witness and required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a
different matter." 370 U.S. at 51-52, quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285
(1936).
But see the arguments before the Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L.
W= 3309 (U.S. 1964). There the parties correctly recognized that there is a con-
nection between the privilege against self-incrimination and the coerced confession
cases. However, in view of the language quioted above, the prosecution would seem to
have been mistaken in conceding that that privilege itself was used to exclude such
confessions from state trials. Id. at 3310. A different, even though analogous, right is
involved in confession cases. Thus these cases do not disturb Twining or Adamson in
any way.
69. For a discussion of the limitations of the direct use of the fifth amendment in
the coerced confession area, see Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 459 (1953).




procedural standard or asserted constitutional right will require ex-
clusion of a confession, for it may not be sufficiently oppressive to
compel the accused to speak against his will. Second, under a right-
of-nondisclosure test, the Court may consider evidence concerning the
personal characteristics of the accused. Police conduct which might
not have any coercive effect on an experienced criminal may well
frighten a child into confessing.
This analysis also has incidental benefits. First, it provides a solid
constitutional foundation for the exertion of federal review of state
trials. The suggested standard is the product of two due process
requirements-first, that constitutionally objectionable evidence cannot
be used in a fair trial, and second, that an involuntary confession is
constitutionally objectionable." Thus federal review, as well as the
exclusionary rule, is based on the combination of two federally pro-
tected rights-the right to a fair trial and the right to refuse to disclose
guilt. Both of these rights relate to the individual accused and the
protection of his interests. Disciplinary control of the state police is
not directly involved, 72 although it may follow as an incidental result.
Second, admissions and exculpatory statements would be covered, as
well as confession, because the right of nondisclosure includes the
right to remain silent and not make statements of any kind. Therefore,
any involuntary declaration, inculpatory or not, is procured in violation
of the right to remain silent.v
III. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE DEFINITION
A. Questioning Is Allowed
The Court's use of the fifth amendment analogy does not, however,
solve all of the problems involved in defining "involuntary." If it can
71. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
72. Cf. Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 77 (1957). Thus, perhaps it is not true that "the ultimate test of the
exclusionary rules is whether they deter police officials from engaging in objectionable
practices." Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw.
U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1953). At least, perhaps this is not the ultimate test of the rule
excluding involuntary confessions. If this rule seeks primarily to protect the individual,
and only incidentally to deter police conduct, the ultimate test is whether the in-
dividual whose right of nondisclosure has been violated can exclude the involuntary
confession at his particular trial.
73. For further discussion of such problems see Note, 5 SAN. L. REV. 459, 461-63
(1953). Wigmore insisted that the common law rule applied only to confessions, not
to exculpatory statements, or even to admissions. 3 WIGMoRE, EvMIENcE § 821 (3d
ed. 1940). The Court has not yet ruled on this point under the fourteenth amendment,
Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 19 WA-H. & LEE L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1962), but it has applied the rule to both
admissions and confessions introduced in federal courts. Brain v. United States, supra
note 64, at 562; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621-22 (1896).
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now be said that the accused has a right to refuse to disclose his guilt,
what is the nature of that right? There are at least three possible in-
terpretations of the practical nature of such a right: (1) If an accused
has a right of nondisclosure of guilt, the police may not seek his aid
in formulating their case against him. (2) The police may question
the accused, but may not use any psychological pressure tactics to
overcome any initial reluctance to confess if he does not cooperate
fully. (3) The police may use some limited forms of such pressure
tactics.
Under the first interpretation, the police could not interrogate or
question 4 an accused at all. It would be possible to support this
argument by some of the broader language of the Court which states
that the accusatory system does not permit the accused to be convicted
out of his own mouth. But the Court has indicated many times that
it is not troubled by interrogation itself, but only by police abuses of
this device. In the latest confession case, Mr. Justice Goldberg re-
stated the Court's attitude: "And, certainly, we do not mean to sug-
gest that all interrogation of witnesses and suspects is impermissible.
Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law
enforcement." 75
Thus, the Court recognizes that a balancing of interests is involved
in this problem, as it is in the protection of most other individual
rights under the fourteenth amendment. A comparison must be made
between the individual's interest in maintaining his freedom of action
and the interest of society in maintaining peace and order.7 6 The fact
74. Any questioning of a person who is suspected of or implicated in a criminal
act is, by definition, an interrogation. U.S. DaT oF ARMY, FixLD M uAr, 19-20,
Cm NAL INvEs-sTATION 36 (1951). Therefore, any questioning of an accused, no
matter how polite, is termed an interrogation. Questioning of persons not suspected
or implicated in a crime is termed an interview.
75. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). See Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961). "And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses
to such offenses, nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked before
it has fairly begun-but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions
... . [S]uch questioning is often indispensible to crime detection. Its compelling
necessity has been judicially recognized as its sufficient justification, even in a society
which, like ours, stands strongly and constitutionally committed to the principle that
persons accused of crime cannot be made to convict themselves out of their own
mouths." Id. at 571. "The principle of the Indian Evidence Act which excludes
all confessions made to the police or by persons while they are detained by the police
has never been accepted . . . in this country. . . . Rather, this Court . . . and the
courts of all the states have agreed in holding permissible the receipt of confessions
secured by the questioning of suspects in custody.... .Id. at 588-90. Accord,
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504,
509 (1958).
76. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, at 315 (1959). The primary examples of
the use of such a weighing process are the decisions involving the protection of first
amendment rights. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. Rav. 46, 63.
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that there is such a weighing process is forgotten by those who insist
that the Constitution requires absolute freedom from any police
interference, at least until after the police have an iron-clad case.
Individuals also have a communal right to be safe in their homes
and on the streets, and this right is enhanced by the apprehension and
conviction of criminals. And the Court has agreed that the police have
a persuasive case that interrogation of suspects is "an essential tool"
in their effort to maintain peace and order in the community."7 This
means that the police do not violate the Constitution when they
question an accused to seek his aid in formulating their case. There-
fore, any definition of "involuntary" must allow at least some limited
form of interrogation of an accused.
B. McNabb-Mallory Is Not Required
A second method of urging that the state police be not allowed to
interrogate an accused person is the argument that the Constitution
requires the imposition of the present federal rule on the states.18 In
all federal criminal trials the court must exclude from evidence any
confession which has been obtained during an unnecessary delay be-
tween the defendant's arrest and his first appearance before a
magistrate (hereinafter called "arraignment" because this has been
the standard terminology in previous discussions of the rule by both
courts and commentators79 )-the McNabb8 °-Mallory8l rule. The rule
is based upon the federal procedural requirement that an arrestee be
arraigned "without unnecessary delay."82 Failure of the federal police
to do so is, therefore, unlawful conduct, and evidence which is an
outgrowth of unlawful conduct may not be used in federal courts.83
Most states have similar statutory rules, requiring the police to
bring arrestees before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.84
77. The language is from Haynes v. Washington, supra note 75, and is quoted there.
The arguments for the necessity of interrogation are well stated in Inbau, supra note
72. That its necessity is recognized is shown by the authorities cited at note 75 supra.
78. For a discussion of the effect of illegal detention on the right to refuse to
disclose guilt see text accompanying notes 141-42 & 170 infra.
79. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338-39 n.2a (D.C. Cir. 1960).
80. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
81. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
82. FED. R. Cram. P. 5. The statute contains no specific language as to the effect
of its violation upon the admissibility of evidence. For a discussion of the "legislative
intent" behind its enactment, see Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Ray. 442 (1948).
83. This is the rationale persuasively argued by Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEe. L.J. 1 (1958). They argue that the
Court, in imposing the McNabb-Mallory rule, was primarily attempting to protect the
federal judiciary from the corrosive influences of tainted evidence, rather than to
punish the federal police for lawlessness. Id. at 30-33.
84. For a list of such statutes see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-43
(1943).
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It would therefore seem possible that the same reasoning might be
applied, so that all confessions obtained by state officers during illegal
detentions would be excluded from state criminal trials. Many authors
have suggested that the Supreme Court should require this of the
states, 1 and that Mapp v. Ohio86 compels such a ruling. They believe
that imposition of the McNabb-Mallory rule on the states would
eliminate interrogations by eliminating delays between arrest and
arraignment. If arrestees are promptly arraigned, they will supposedly
have immediate access to counsel, who will of course tell them to keep
quiet, making interrogation useless. Also they will supposedly be
immediately bailed from custody, making interrogation impossible.
Unfortunately, this argument ignores the fact that arraignment, bail,
and an attorney are not always immediately available even in the best
of legal systems. There are situations in which long delays in arraign-
ing arrestees are necessary. 7 Also, not all defendants can make bail
immediately-or even make bail at all-and not every attorney enters
his client's case during the first appearance before a magistrate. 88 At
least, the argument runs, the arrestee will be warned as to his rights
by the magistrate. But a warning is useless unless it is understood,
and being told "It-is-my-duty-to-warn-you-that-you-have-a-right-to-
the-aid-of-counsel-and-to-remain-s ile nt-but-anything-you-say-may-b e-
used-in-evidence-against-you" by a hostile committing magistrate who
feels that the local police are being unreasonably hampered in the
performance of their duties would scarcely be helpful even to a pro-
fessor of criminal law. 9 Imposition of the McNabb-Mallory rule on
the states should not, therefore, be regarded as a panacea which will
eliminate all involuntary confession problems. At best it helps some
arrestees and shifts the problems to the post-arraignment period. As
85. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L.
REv. 483, 564-94 (1963); Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41
NEB. L. REv. 185, 201 (1961); Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contem-
poraneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal
Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78; Comment, 1 CATHoLic U.L. REV. 1 (1950); Note,
24 GA. B.J. 120 (1961).
86. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
87. For examples of such situations see Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2
VAND. L. REv. 509, 631-32 (1949). Prevention of the disappearance of accomplices
is a primary example of a necessary reason for sometimes protracted delay. See also
Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1013-20 (1959).
88. See, e.g., SPECIAL Cofm-rrrEC OF THE NEW YoRx Cr- BAR Ass'N, EQUAL Jus-
TICE FOR THE AccusED 67 (1959); N.J. ADMmNISTRA-TON OFFICE OF TH CouRrTs,
REPORT ON THE ASSIGNED CouNsEL SYsTEm 6 (1955). These reports indicate that for
indigent defendants delays of two to three months between arrest and appointment of
counsel are typical.
89. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police




the federal courts have learned, it does not eliminate the necessity for
an accurate definition of "involuntary.
A Supreme Court ruling that the McNabb-Mallory rule is constitu-
tionally required of the states would, however, have a great effect
on its review of state confession cases and would probably affect the
Court's definition of "involuntary."91 It is therefore necessary to ex-
amine the arguments to see whether such a ruling is required. There
are at least three lines of argument that Mapp compels the McNabb-
Mallory rule to be enforced in state criminal trials. The first argument
is based on the belief that Mapp generally precludes "lawless law
enforcement" by state officers, and requires the exclusion of all evi-
dence procured through violations of state statutes. The second argu-
ment is that Mapp declares that every due process right must be ef-
fectively protected by the courts.92 It then finds a due process right to
a prompt arraignment, and finds that this right can be protected only
by the McNabb-Mallory rule. The third argument also starts from the
premise that Mapp declares that every due process right must be af-
forded effective protection. However, the due process right which this
argument seeks to protect is the arrestee's right to refuse to disclose
his guilt.
It should first be made clear that the Court, when deciding Mapp,
did not believe that its rationale compelled the imposition of McNabb-
Mallory on the states. The fourteenth amendment confession cases
are cited with approval to show that Mapp is merely raising the pro-
tection against search and seizure up to a level previously attained in
the confession cases.9 3 The confession cases had already determined
that involuntary confessions should be excluded from state criminal
trials, regardless of state rules concerning the admissibility of reliable
confessions. Mapp held that unconstitutionally seized evidence should
be excluded, regardless of state rules on admissibility. Therefore, Mapp
90. For example, during the last term of the United States Supreme Court it was
faced with the necessity of ruling on the voluntariness of confessions in two federal
criminal cases. In each case the McNabb-Mallory rule did not apply. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341
(1963). See also United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951). Also, in any case
where there is a necessary delay in arraignment, either voluntary or involuntary
confessions may be produced, depending upon the defendant's state of mind.
01. Cf. pp. 447-53 infra, especially text accompanying note 142.
92. 367 U.S. at 655-57.
93. "Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning
the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. . . .This Court has not
hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it does against the Federal Govern-
ment the rights . . . not to be convicted by use of coerced confession, however
logically relevant it be, and without regard to its reliability. . . .Why should not
the same rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by way of unconstitu-




took a step in search and seizure law which had been taken long
before in regard to confessions. If the Court had believed that the
Mapp rationale required such a change in the use of confessions, it had
an opportunity to indicate this on the same decision day when it also
handed down Culombe v. Connecticut.4 Instead, in Culombe, it ex-
pressly disclaimed any intention of imposing McNabb-Mallory on the
states.95
The first argument, based upon the rationale that the Court is
proscribing any evidence obtained in violation of state law, is almost
a straw man. It has no relation to the Mapp holding. The purpose of
the exclusionary rule in Mapp is to protect the individual's federal
constitutional rights, 5 not to enforce state laws, nor even to preserve
the integrity of state courts.97 To make state statutory law controlling
in this area would be a remarkable departure from constitutional
doctrine and could hardly be relied upon to protect individual rights.
Many states have laws which allow the police to detain the accused
for one to three days after arrest before they must bring him before
a magistrate.98 These periods could of course be extended. Thus, any
extension of McNabb-Mallory to the states must be based on the pro-
tection of a primary due process right, such as a supposed right to a
prompt arraignment, not upon any present statutory illegality of de-
tentions, for that illegality could disappear overnight.99 To clarify the
constitutional problems involved, the discussion below will assume
that the states have all enacted a statute permitting detention of an
94. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
95. "The McNabb case was an innovation which derived from our concern and
responsibility for fair modes of criminal proceeding in the federal courts. . .. And
although we adhere unreservedly to McNabb for federal criminal cases, we have not
extended its rule to state prosecutions as a requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 600-01.
96. "Since the Fourth Amendments right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern-
ment." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
97. Compare the rationale of McNabb as stated in Hogan & Snee, supra note 83.
98. See, e.g., CAL. PENr. CODE § 825 (Deering 1959); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, §
1911 (1953); HAwA-x REv. LAws §§ 255-9 (1955); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:23
(1955); 1R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-7-13 (1956). See also Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942), and the comments thereon in Foote, The
Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. Curn. L.,
C. & P.S. 402 (1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16
(1957).
99. There is, of course, the possibility that the state statutes requiring prompt
arraignment would not be changed. That would be up to the legislatures, and cannot
be predicted. On the one hand, one can ask why these statutes have not been
previously repealed. But the rebuttal to such an argument is the fact that the McNabb-
Mallory rule has not been enacted into legislation. Certainly, police pressure for
amendment of the present state laws would increase drastically if the exclusionary-
rule were a necessary corollary to any violation of those laws.
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arrestee for a specific number of hours before arraignment.
The problem with the second argument, based upon a due process
right to a prompt arraignment, is that probably no such right exists.
At least the United States Supreme Court has never enunciated such
a right. No such enunciation could come out of its decisions in cases
involving confessions used in state courts, because there the Court
has been seeking the state of mind of the defendant. It has not
based its decisions upon any single police tactic, but upon the
"totality of circumstances" and their effect upon the defendant.' Nor
do the confession cases arising in federal courts establish such a right
under the fourth amendment' 01-the McNabb rule was born of the
Court's inherent power to formulate "rules of evidence to be applied
in federal criminal prosecutions," 02 and arose from a federal statute,'0 3
not from a constitutional source.104 Thus any enunciation of a due
process right to a prompt arraignment must come from a source
outside the confession cases, either state or federal.'05
One such source'06 is the cases involving unconstitutional arrest.
100. In the last confession case of the 1962-1963 term, a four-day detention (in
violation of a state anti-incommunicado detention statute) was held to be only an
"attendant circumstance" to consider in determining involuntariness. Haynes v. Wash-
ington, supra note 75, at 517. The violation is mentioned only in a footnote, and is
used primarily to buttress the Court's belief that the defendant's "version of what
happened earlier" is true. Id. at 511 n.8. Thus, the fourteenth amendment confession
cases show no tendency to establish a due process right to a prompt arraignment.
101. Hogan & Snee, supra note 83. If there is no such right under the fourth
amendment, then a fortiori there is no right under the fourteenth.
102. McNabb v. United States, supra note 80, at 341.
103. The Court cited both 18 U.S.C. § 595 and 48 Stat. 1008 (1934). The re-
quirement now arises from FED. R. Camm. P. 5a.
104. Nor does Mallory, supra note 81, adopt a constitutional basis. It involved a
technical construction of statutory wording. And in the Mapp decision itself, the
McNabb-Mallory rule is expressly denominated an evidentiary one. Mapp v. Ohio,
supra note 96, at 650.
105. Cf. Broeder, supra note 85, at 42 NEB. L. REv. 572-73. However this argu-
ment seems based on a misreading of a footnote in Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 486 n.12 (1963). The Court there cites Hogan & Snee, supra note 83, for
the proposition that McNabb-Mallory is capable of excluding both voluntary and in-
voluntary confessions. The passage cited does stand for such a proposition, because it
states that the rule offers greater protection to defendants against use of interrogation
than does the more restricted involuntariness standard. This does not necessarily mean
that the Court now regards McNabb-Mallory as a due process requirement.
106. A second source is The Civil Rights Act Cases, and in particular Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). In Williams the Court upheld the conviction under
the Civil Rights Act of a man who had, under color of state law, beaten confessions
out of several suspects during an investigation. The Court never determined whether or
not the confessions were ever used as evidence. See Allen, supra note 72, at 22-23.
Therefore, this decision cannot be explained by the combination fair trial and state of
mind rationale of the confession cases. Instead, this case must stand for the proposi-
tion that a person has some due process rights during interrogation which do not
depend upon the later use of any confession. But the Court was quite careful to
limit strictly the ambit of such rights. It stated that the right involved was one to
be free "from the use of force and violence to obtain a confession." 341 U.S. at
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The argument is that, if due process protects the individual's right of
privacy against unconstitutional arrests, then "a fortiori"1°7 it must
also protect against delayed arraignments, because the latter constitute
even greater invasions of one's privacy. This argument, however,
ignores some basic differences between the two situations. The
application of the McNabb-Mallory rule has never depended upon
102-03. It is true that strict construction was required because a criminal statute was
involved, but it is still a very long legal journey from holding that an individual has
a right not to be beaten to pronouncing a right to a prompt arraignment. Further,
as will be shown below, the purposes behind each right would not be similar. At
least it can be said that The Civil Rights Act Cases do not now offer any support for
the establishment of the latter right.
107. The argument is made by Broeder, supra note 85, 42 NEB. L. BR. at 570. The
full argument runs as follows: (1) Wong Sun extends the Weeks doctrine and holds
that evidence which is the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest is inadmissible in a federal
criminal trial. This exclusionary rule extends to declarations of the arrestee, whether
voluntary or not. (2) Mapp excludes all evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment, so that all evidence which is the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest is in-
admissible. (3) If the fruits of an unconstitutional arrest are excluded, fruits of an
"illegal detention" must "a fortiori" be excluded, because the latter is an even greater
invasion of one's right to privacy.
Exceptions may be taken to each of these reasoning steps, but the major objection
is to the last step. This objection is discussed in the text above. As to the first
step, see the discussion in the text accompanying note 142 infra. In Wong Sun, the
Court held inadmissible the fruit of an illegal arrest and search. Thus, the Weeks
doctrine may be unchanged. It also emphasized the "oppressive circumstances" of
the defendant's position, which made it impossible for his statement to be "an act
of free will." 371 U.S. at 486. Such language has traditionally been used in the
confession cases to denote involuntary confessions, but does not apply to voluntary
statements. See notes 52-53 supra; Prescoe v. Maryland, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226
(1963); Broeder, supra note 85, 42 Nun. L. Iuy. at 523-24; cf. Killough v. United
States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The arguments pro and con are outlined by
Kamisar, supra note 85. Therefore the voluntariness of the statements may still deter-
mine their admissibility.
The extension of any "fruits" doctrine to voluntary statements is even more difficult
when other rules, less mechanical, are available to protect the accused's rights, and
when the extension is to be made under the due process concept. The rationale of
the Mapp rule depends upon the necessity of effectively protecting the right to privacy
and the failure of all alternative remedies. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652, 655
(1961). Protection against unconstitutional procurement of confessions through un-
reasonable arrests is available from two sources-the involuntary confession rule and
the "fruits" doctrine. And the Court does not feel that the involuntary confession
rule is ineffective. In Mapp, it stated exactly the contrary. 367 U.S. at 656, quoted at
note 82 supra.
But the Court, in an illegal search and seizure case decided last year, has applied
the "fruits" doctrine to statements without considering whether those statements were
voluntary. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). Whether that decision portends
that the "fruits" doctrine will be used to determine admissibility in all situations,
rather than the voluntariness of statements, only the future can tell. If the Court de-
liberately chose not to consider the voluntariness of the confession, the fruits doctrine
applies at least in cases involving illegal searches and seizures. Such a decision would
still not require use of the fruits doctrine in illegal arrest cases. And, even if the Court
decides to employ the fruits doctrine in illegal arrest cases, the voluntariness standard




the illegality or unconstitutionality of the accused's arrest. Even if an
illegal arrest is an unconstitutional seizure of the person, it does not
necessarily follow that a detention for a limited time, when permitted
by state statute,10 8 and following a legal arrest is also such an un-
constitutional seizure. The fact that the police may not interfere with
one's movements without probable cause does not, in and of itself,
impose limits upon their interference with the activities of an arrestee
once probable cause is present. The arrestee's privacy has already been
invaded at the time of arrest, and rightfully so if the arrest was upon
probable cause. The interference caused by delay in arraignment is
with the arrestee's right to bail and his ability to consult counsel. But
bail and counsel are not being denied, they are being delayed. There-
fore the question is not whether the police have a right to violate one's
privacy without probable cause, but whether the presence of probable
cause permits the police not only to interfere initially with a persons
privacy by arresting him, but also to interrupt temporarily his ability
to procure bail and consult an attorney.
At least two lines of cases permit the police to do so. The con-
fession cases twice expressly rejected the argument that denial of
access to counsel invalidates confessions per se and subsequently have
regarded such a denial as only one criterion among the many to be
considered in determining admissibility of confessions. 1°9 Also, the
right to counsel cases do not seem to require counsel in the station-
house. Those cases, based on the sixth amendment, are concerned
with providing appointed attorneys to represent indigent defendants
during the trial itself. They do not even require that counsel be pro-
vided in all proceedings in court. Counsel is not required at all
arraignments, but only at those deemed "critical," which are those
where technical pleas and motions must be made or are forever lost."0
Thus, the objective sought by these cases seems to be to protect the
defendant from losing his opportunity to present his defense through
procedural and evidentiary technical rules, not to impede the investi-
gation of crimes."' Until the proceedings reach the courts, these
technicalities are not present. Thus, a due process right to a prompt
108. This was assumed at text following note 99 supra.
109. For further discussion see notes 39-41 supra.
110. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963).
1-11. Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959). "[Ilt would effectively
preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was afforded op-
portunity to call his attorney. Due process . . . demands no such rule." Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958). "Even in federal prosecutions this Court has
refrained from laying down any such inflexible rule." Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504,
509 (1958). (Emphasis added.) Nor does Massiah v. United States, 32 U.S.L. Wimc
4389, decided as this goes to press, hold contrary. That decision recognizes the dif-
ference between the investigative and later phases of a case, by limiting its holding
to an indicated defendant.
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arraignment cannot be found through cases involving illegal arrest
or right to counsel, and in fact cannot be found at all. In processing
persons legally arrested, the police have authority to interrogate, for
it is a recognized and essential tool in protecting the other individuals
in the community. They may use any voluntary confessions so ob-
tained-that is, confessions obtained without violating the accused's
right to refuse to disclose his guilt.
In the third argument for imposing McNabb-Mallory on the states,
based on protecting the right to remain silent, the difference between
use of the objective standard and the subjective state-of-mind test in
the confession cases becomes crucial. The primary problem in making
this third argument is in showing that McNabb-Mallory can effectively
protect the right of nondisclosure. If that right is presently receiving
insufficient protection, the Court has two alternatives. It may impose
McNabb-Mallory on the states, or it may clarify and/or expand its
present definition of "involuntary."
In determining the effectiveness of the McNabb-Mallory remedy, it
becomes important to compare its purpose with the purpose of the
right of non-disclosure. If they are not the same, McNabb-Mallory
will hamper investigation where protection is not needed and will
fail to offer protection where it is needed."2 If the objective standard
is the true explanation of the confession cases, these purposes could
be said to be the same. Both McNabb-Mallory and the objective
standard seek to control the conduct of the police. But since the
Court is using a subjective test and seeking to ascertain the state of
the defendant's mind, the purposes are different. McNabb-Mallory
seeks to enforce a federal statute requiring an arraignment before a
magistrate. On the other hand, the confession cases seek to protect
the constitutional right to a fair trial by excluding unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence, and to protect the individual from speaking under
a prohibited state of mind. The latter is concerned with the type of
evidence introduced during the trial; the former is concerned with
the court procedures leading to the trial.
Of course an incidental benefit of McNabb-Mallory is that some
coerced confessions are eliminated. But since the purpose of this rule
is to effectuate a federal statute requiring arraignment, it can hardly
be the most effective resolution of the competing individual and
societal interests involved in protecting the right of non-disclosure.
Thus, where the Court may choose between enforcing this right either
by a mechanical rule absolutely prohibiting use of confessions obtained
112. As one of the advocates of stricter regulation of state police activities has well
said: "The McNabb rule does stem from the Court's greater control over federal
criminal justice, but it also deals with lesser violations than coerced confessions-mere
breaches of the federal rules governing prompt commitment, as opposed to violations
of the federal constitution." Kamisar, supra note 85, at 101.
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during an unnecessary delay before arraignment, or by a more flexible
rule which considers the total circumstances, 113 the latter course seems
preferable.114 McNabb-Mallory can never be more than a supplement
to the present voluntariness standard, because of necessary delays in
arraignment, and especially because of the possibility of post-arraign-
ment interrogation."5 On the other hand, since the police may
question an accused reasonably, 116 that rule needlessly hampers allow-
able investigation." 7 Application of the rule depends in no way upon
113. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 443 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,
197 (1957). The fact that the Court looks at the totality of circumstances does not
necessarily mean that it bases its decisions on defense evidence which has been con-
tradicted. Cf. Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 53-55, 66 (1962). It does mean, how-
ever, that the Court looks at many different facets of the interrogation and does not
base its decision on any one action of the state police.
114. In making such a decision, Mapp and the search and seizure cases should be
regarded as inapposite. The protection of most individual rights under the fourteenth
amendment involves a balancing of interests-a comparison of the individual's interest
in maintaining his freedom of action with the interest of society in maintaining
peace and order in the community. See note 76 supra. The search and seizure eases
stand as an abberation in this general pattern in that Mapp excludes all evidence
resulting from any illegality in the search, whether serious or technical. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). A prime example of the problem is Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958). This situation was, however, produced by a set of cir-
cumstances which is not present in the confession cases.
Two decisions, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954), formed the pattern. Wolf laid down the absolute rule that the
fourteenth amendment did not require evidence illegally seized to be excluded. Irvine
made this rule absolute by making it applicable even where the police conduct was
admittedly outrageous. Thus the Court, when presented with the task of making
meaningful the fourteenth amendment guarantee of a right of privacy, could not
easily use the balancing of interests rationale. Instead, it overruled one absolute
rule with a second absolute rule. This about face was done in spite of the fact that
many of the arguments in Mapp are more applicable to the overthrow of Irvine than
of Wolf. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Su'. CT. REv. 1, 29, 32. See also Allen, supra note 72, at 29.
However, the Court has not placed itself in such a predicament in deciding con-
fession cases. The best analogy to Irvine in this area would have been Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), if it had been decided the other way and had upheld
the convictions. Under such a decision, psychological pressure alone would not have
been sufficient to require exclusion of confessions. This, and later decisions in which
evidence of physical coercion was conflicting, would have required the imposition of a
mechanical rule, such as McNabb-Mallory, to protect the accused against possible
police brutality. But the Court decided in Chambers to exclude evidence procured
by psychological as well as physical coercion, so the analogy does not apply, and the
analogous need for a mechanical rule is not present.
115. See discussion at notes 87-90 supra.
116. See discussion at notes 75-78 supra.
117. For a police chief's reaction to the effect of McNabb-Mallory on his work see
U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 23, 1963, p. 92.
There is also an additional and hidden cost in using an exclusionary rule which is
not exactly adapted to the objective sought. The courts may distort the concept of
arrest to delay its occurrence. Examples of this may be seen in the federal cases. See




the accused's state of mind, but only upon when the questioning oc-
curs. Nor is the fact that the defendant is under arrest when
questioned reliable evidence of the prohibited state of mind."8 The
Court has recognized that questioning after arrest will not necessarily
coerce confessions from intelligent adults, especially from those who
are experienced in crime, are educated in the law, or have previously
consulted attorneys." 9 Also it would easily be possible for the police
to record'all questioning during such a delay and to show thereby
the voluntariness of the confession.120 This disregard of the accused's
probable state of mind is undoubtedly why the Court has never made
McNabb-Mallory a constitutional requirement, but has instead quite
properly concentrated on enforcing the voluntariness standard.
The previous discussion does not mean that it is impossible for the
Court to impose McNabb-Mallory on the states. As can be seen, there
are many arguments for such a decision and they have been stated
effectively many times.'2 ' The discussion herein has been based on
the assumption that there would be effective state judicial control
over police interrogation and arrest tactics. If there is no such control,
these arguments become progressively less forceful. It then becomes
the duty of the federal courts to exercise such control-an enormous
administrative task. If extensive federal supervision is required, im-
position of McNabb-Mallory on the states may be necessary to any
effective supervision, because of its relative ease of administration. To
ascertain whether such control is needed, we must ask: How well are
the states applying the present standard? To answer that question,
we must first determine what methods of analysis should be used in
applying this definition of involuntary.
C. A Suggested Method of Analysis
If the police may interrogate the accused, but are held to a higher
standard than merely refraining from uncivilized conduct, what is
the present standard? What is the prohibited state of mind? Both the
language and the rulings of the Court offer clues. The Court has often
described the prohibited state of mind as one in which "the defend-
ants will was overborne", or where his statements were not "the
118. See, e.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). But the best authority
for such a statement is United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), where statements
made after arrest were held admissible even under the McNabb rule.
1 119. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
120. For an example of the use of this technique see People v. Kendrick, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13 (1961). See also the discussion of such controls by Weisberg,
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in PoLIcE PowER AN
INDviIDuAL FREEnom 179-81 (Sowle ed. 1962).
121. See authorities cited at note 85 supra.
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expression of free choice."122 It has further stated that the defendant's
will is overborne when "further resistance [in denying guilt]
seem[s] useless" to him.' This indicates not only that the police may
use psychological pressure tactics to induce an admissible confession,
but also that a fairly high degree of pressure may be applied before
the Court will term the confession "involuntary." The rulings of the
Court buttress such a conclusion. It has held that the use of certain
psychological pressure tactics for a limited time does not require the
exclusion of resulting confession. The police may illegally detain the
accused, fail to warn him of his rights, or deny him access to counsel
without necessarily overbearing his will.u4 Each of these is a tactic
which places greater pressure on the accused than the mere asking
of questions. But the Court believes that they are not sufficient to
cause a normal person to feel that further resistance to the interroga-
tion is useless, because most men have some ability to remain silent
in the face of routine questioning. m
Thus it seems possible at least to set a minimum limit on interroga-
tion pressure so that use of less pressure will usually result in an
admissible confession. The police may question the accused and use
some pressure tactics for at least a limited period of time and still
obtain a voluntary confession. On the other hand, it may be possible
to set a maximum limit on interrogation pressure so that use of more
intensive tactics will usually remove any response from the category
of "voluntary conduct" and require exclusion of that response. The
Court has recently reversed three convictions when the period of in-
communicado detention was four to five days.126 In each case the
Court found other circumstances which intensified the coerciveness
of such detention,'2 but these cases may indicate some limit on police
122. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
123. Reck v. Pate, supra note 122, at 444. "A confession by which life becomes
forfeit must be the product of free choice. . . . But if it is the product of sustained
pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice." Watts v. Indiana, supra
note 122, at 53 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
124. See authorities cited at note 119 supra. See also the language from Gallegos v.
Colorado quoted at note 43 supra.
125. Such an assumption is necessary, for otherwise all actions could be termed in-
voluntary. Contract law provides an analogous problem in defining duress, for all
"consent" to contract is in a sense-coerced. A seller refuses to make a gift of his goods
and thereby "coerces" a buyer into paying by making payment the only way to get the
goods, when buyer would much prefer to get the goods and keep his money. For
a discussion of the problem in the contract context, see Hale, Bargaining, Duress,
and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUTr. L. BEgv. 603 (1943). See also DaIzell, Duress by
Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 341 (1942), and notes 30 supra and 151 infra.
126. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962); Reck v. Pate, supra note 122.
127. In Reck and Gallegos the Court relied heavily on the type of defendant in-
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conduct, at which point the record will be thoroughly examined for
any other indicia of coercion.128 On the other hand, the amount of
pressure allowable may be much less; the Court has not indicated.
Either way, some method must be developed to analyze cases which
fall between the maximum and minimum limits set forth above, for
they include the vast majority of the cases before the courts.
One method of deciding these cases is to list criteria and to try to
color-match the factual situations of cases. This theory has been used
by many state courts. 2 9 It is quite easy to list many interrogation
practices the Court does not like.130 Such a list is useless, however, in
determining an individual case. No one criterion on the list may be
relied upon to decide the question of voluntariness, for the Court
considers the total circumstances. If several different tactics have been
used, the list does not evaluate their individual importance or show
any way of interrelating them or evaluating the effect of the combina-
tion.
The limited usefulness of such lists is due to their overconcern with
objective criteria. Such concern would be well-founded if the Court
were using an objective standard. Then one could list the police
tactics, measure them against some ideal standard, and decide whether
the conduct was outrageous. But the Court is not using an objective
standard, it is ascertaining states of mind; so lists of objective criteria
will never give a complete analysis of its decisions. A more useful
method of analyzing these cases would start with a prohibited state
of mind and consider how it may be produced. Such an analysis should
allow some meaningful interrelation of the effect of the use of several
interrogation practices.
131
The following discussion, showing a method of analysis based on
one significant mental condition, is not intended to be an exhaustive
volved. In Haynes the Court found the use of threats and inducements-the authorities
refused to allow the defendant to call his wife until he was "booked," which meant
by implication only after he had confessed.
128. It can hardly be said that such a limit is over-restrictive of police conduct.
But Professor Inbau argues only for the necessity of an interrogation period "of perhaps
several hours." Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 80 (1957). Policemen who desire authority for longer incom-
municado detention would seem to have a very low regard for individual liberty.
129. See note 165 infra. This method was expressly disapproved by the Court in
Reek v. Pate, supra note 122, at 442.
130. One such list is contained in Note, 33 NEB. L. Rnv. 507, 508 (1953). See
also Comment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 82 n.9. Such a list might also be derived from
this article from the textual discussion following note 131 infra, but it would probably
not be as complete as those cited.
131. Any such analysis must consider objective facts, such as the length of question-
ing. This is because the Court is not determining the actual state of mind of the
defendant, but a presumptive state of mind from these objective facts. See text at




consideration of the types of situations which arise during interroga-
tion. It is but a lengthy illustration of the way in which the many
variations of one of the basic situations should be approached. Nor
will it attempt to ascertain quantitative data-for example, the limit on
the number of days an accused may be illegally detained-but will
only try to find meaningful ways of interrelating different interroga-
tion tactics.
One state of mind cited by the police as helping to induce an ac-
cused to confess is fear or anxiety.132 The courts also recognized this
point at an early date, and the common law excluded confessions
caused by fear through the use of threats or brutality.133 Yet recogni-
tion of fear or anxiety as a state of mind which invalidates confessions
has been severely limited. Many courts have thought that only threats
or violence (brutality) could create a sufficiently adverse state of mind
to require the exclusion of a confession. 34 Such an outlook may be
valid if only untrue confessions are excluded. Thus, it might be said
that only beatings or threats could induce sufficient fear in an accused
to cause him to make a false confession. But it cannot be said that
these are the only methods which can induce sufficient fear or anxiety
to cause him to make a true confession against his will, which is
equally objectionable under the Court's present standard.
For instance, fear that the police will hold him in custody until he
confesses is quite likely to compel an accused to confess. He may con-
clude that further silence is useless, on the assumption that confession
is the only way to end such custody. This fear may arise from express
threats by the police; or it may be inferred by the accused if the police
detain him for a long time, during which a confession is sought, and
make no indication that they will release him without a confession-
such an inference would certainly be reasonable. And any confession
caused by fear for his liberty if he persists in refusing to confess
violates his right of nondisclosure.3
It would be impossible, however, to discover how long a detention
must be in order that the accused will be presumed 136 to make such an
132. INBAU & REID, LE DETECTION AND CMIMINAL INTERROGATION 151-56 (3d ed.
1953); MAGUruE, EVIDENCE O Cui.T 109 (1959); O'HAnA, FuNDAmENTALs o
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 108 (1956).
133. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); The King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach
263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783). See also 3 WiGmonE, EVIDENCE § 825 (3d ed.
1940).
134. See notes 166-70 infra.
135. Although Haynes v. Washington, supra note 122, involved express threats of
continued incommunicado detention, some of the Court's language is instructive:
"[E]ven apart from the express threat, the basic techniques present here-the secret
and incommunicado detention and interrogation-are devices adapted and used to
extort confessions from subjects." Id. at 514. See also State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045,
58 N.W.2d 44 (1953).
136. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
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inference, for any such decision must depend upon many other
factors, such as the method of questioning, the type of detention, and
the type of person the accused is. If the questioning is long, con-
tinuous, or persistent,137 the interrogator is obviously hostile, 138 great
numbers of police are present,131 or arms are obviously carried,140
anxiety will be induced much more quickly than if such interrogation
methods are not used. Thus the length of interrogation which will
make an accused become so fearful that his will is overborne will
vary according to the presence of any one of several factors. With
so many independent variables, it would be illusory to try to specify
any set length of interrogation as oppressive.
Courts must consider not only interrogation methods practiced as
outlined above, but also the type of detention employed. The use of
either illegal'4' or incommunicado detention may be considered to
increase oppressiveness. However, these factors should not be evalu-
ated on the basis of their objectionableness to society or deviation
from an ideal standard of police conduct, but rather on the basis of
their probable effect on the accused and his ability to refuse to disclose
his guilt or assert his innocence. Thus any illegality of detention
should not be considered relevant to a determination of "voluntariness"
137. Such questioning not only establishes an oppressive atmosphere which frightens
the accused, but also causes him to believe that confession is the only way out of
the station house. State v. Archer, supra note 135. Repeatedly asking the same ques-
tion without regard to the accused's answers soon implies that the previous answers are
not acceptable and that only one kind of answer will satisfy the police. Such an
anxiety-producing effect is in addition to any exhaustion of the defendant caused by
such tactics. Cf. Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 174 A.2d 163 (1961).
Even the police manuals agree that persistent questioning will allow the interrogator
to "dominate his subject": "[w]here emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no
avail [the investigator] must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence.
He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of
surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will
to obtain the truth. In a serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the
required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite from the atmosphere of
domination. It is possible in this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting
to duress or coercion. The method should be used only when the guilt of the subject
appears highly probable." O'HARA, op. cit. supra note 132, at 112.
138. State v. Floyd, 223 S.C. 413, 76 S.E.2d 291 (1953). See also authorities
cited at note 132 supra. But see Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P.2d 892
(1950). On the other hand, there is a greater danger that soft or neutral questioning
can be interpreted as a promise of benefit for confessing.
139. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). Cf. State v. Solomon, 222, La.
269, 282, 62 So. 2d 481, 485 (1952) (that there were twenty-seven interrogators held
irrelevant).
140. See People v. Price, 24 Ill. 2d 46, 57, 179 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1962); Cf.
State v. Worthy, 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E.2d 835 (1962).
141. Such illegality may be caused by violation of a prompt arraignment statute,
or by use of a sham loitering or vagrancy charge. For a discussion of the incidence
of the use of loitering and vagrancy charges as illegal detention tools, see Foote, Safe-
guards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 16, 20-27 (1957).
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unless the accused is aware of that illegality. Only then can it be said
to affect his state of mind and induce greater anxiety than would a
legal detention.'i Incommunicado detention, on the other hand, is a
much more important consideration. Almost certainly the accused
will realize that he is not permitted to communicate with the outside
world, and this will increase his anxiety more than the mere fact of
being detained. This, in turn, reduces the length of detention required
for the accused to reach the prohibited state of mind in which the
police dominate him.
143
Each of these fact patterns must also be evaluated on the basis of
the type of defendant involved and his probable ability to resist
interrogation. For example, a greater length of detention may be
required to frighten an accused who knows his rights, such as an
educated adult or an experienced criminal. 44 But other abuses, such
as unlawful or secret processing, may take on greater significance for
them than for others. 145 Hostile questioning may easily frighten mem-
bers of minority groups, 46 but may put the educated adult on guard
against the interrogator.147 Extremely youthful arrestees may become
excessively disturbed by separation from their families; and a meaning-
ful warning as to their rights, one which will enable them to appreciate
the effect of those rights on their situation, would then become
especially important.148
The central idea, however, of the suggested method of analysis
142. State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962); State v. Higdeon, 356
Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947); Collins v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 585, 352 S.W.2d
841 (1961). See also People v. Weinstein, 11 N.Y.2d 1098, 184 N.E.2d 312, 2-30
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1962).
This line of reasoning, however, may be foreclosed by the Supreme Court under the
"fruits" doctrine. See the discussion of Fahy v. Connecticut at note 107 supra. Such a
holding would be outside the voluntariness standard, and should not be regarded as
affecting in any way analysis under that standard.
143. Haynes v. Washington, supra note 122. Incommunicado detention increases
anxiety in two ways: (1) It makes it more difficult to procure aid, and thereby to
obtain one's release. (2) The accused knows that his unexplained disappearance causes
his family to worry and takes away their source of financial support.
144. Stein v. New York, supra note 119; Crooker v. California, supra note 119.
145. See authorities cited in note 142 supra.
146. Cf. State v. Worthy, supra note 140.
147. IhmAu & REm, op. cit. supra note 132, at 179.
148. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1963); People v. Nemke, 23 Ill. App. 2d
591, 179 N.E.2d 825 (1962). Warning the accused of his right to counsel and his
right to remain silent will be helpful only if the meaning of those rights is clear to
him. Thus the police would not only have to state the warnings meaningfully, but
would also have to enable the accused to appreciate their effect upon his situation.
If he can not appreciate their effect, no amount of pious pronouncement of the
proper words can lessen the effect of the detention upon his state of mind. Fikes
v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948);
United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 1943); cf. United States v. Grote,
140 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1944); State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962).
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is that each of these factors is relevant only insofar as it affects the
defendant's probable state of mind. Since anxiety increases more
rapidly when aggravating factors are present, their use will reduce the
length of detention required to overbear the defendant's will to remain
silent. 49 The fact that the aggravating factor may also have been
improper police conduct, or a violation of a statutory command, does
not necessarily mean that the resulting confession was involuntary.
Nor should the issue of involuntariness be dependent upon the viola-
tion of other constitutional rights, unless the defendant knew his
rights were being violated and thereby became more fearful of still
further abuses of his rights.
D. Summary
All of the foregoing considerations should illustrate the impossibility
of setting forth any specific, or litmus paper test,150 definition of "in-
voluntary." For example, one cannot say that any certain length of
detention, legal or otherwise, is a dividing line between voluntary and
involuntary confessions. However, this does not mean that nothing
can be done in regard to defining this term. A definition can be
approached by setting forth: (1) interrogation procedure which proba-
bly cannot be held to cause an accused to make an involuntary
confession; (2) interrogation procedure which will usually require
the exclusion of any resulting confession; and (3) a method of
analyzing situations which fall between these probable limits.
In considering any problem in this area, the primary concern must
be the probable state of mind of the accused. The question is whether
he thought that further resistance to the interrogator's insistence that
he confess was useless. Thus the interrogation pressures must overbear
his will to refuse to disclose his guilt. Neither questioning of the
accused after arrest nor minimal use of pressure tactics is deemed
to overbear his will. The police may, therefore, illegally detain the
accused for a limited time, fail to warn him of his rights, prevent him
from contacting his attorney, and secretly question him, all without
automatically producing an involuntary confession. The Court realizes
both that appropriately limited interrogation is an essential investiga-
tive tool and that most persons have enough mental fortitude to resist
149. On the other hand, detention during which aid and advice are available creates
less anxiety, so that the coercive effect of the detention is comparatively less. In
determining the effect of the interrogation tactics used, one must consider not only
what the police have done to increase the oppressive atmosphere of the detention
and interrogation, but also what the police did which relieved that atmosphere, such
as warning the accused and permitting communication to his family and advice from
counsel.
150. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961).
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such interrogation for a limited time. After a few hours of such
questioning, however, the accused's ability to resist these pressures
may become more questionable, and the admissibility of any confes-
sion elicited less certain.
On the other hand, the Court seems to consider incommunicado
detention for four or five days, with the usual attendant practices,
sufficiently distressing to require the exclusion of most confessions
resulting therefrom. Exceptions might be made for the experienced
criminal or the trained lawyer, but probably few others have sufficient
knowledge and presence of mind not to conclude under such circum-
stances that confession is the only way out of the station house. Thus
the probable effect of such tactics is to make any further refusal to
confess seem useless to the accused, as not enhancing his chances
of ending the detention, but only delaying that termination.
Most situations fall between these limits, however, and must be
judged on a case by case basis. Even though it does not provide
specific answers in this area, a definition of voluntariness based on a
right of non-disclosure is helpful. It does provide a method of evalu-
ating the combined effect of the many relevant facets of an interroga-
tion. This is done by directing all efforts toward answering the ques-
tion: What was the probable total effect of the interrogation on the
accused's state of mind? After such treatment, would this type of
person probably be able to refuse to disclose his guilt and believe that
he could continue to do so throughout the remainder of the interroga-
tion?
IV. STATE COURT DECISIONS
Certainly the state courts are capable of deciding such questions,
so that the federal courts should not have to supervise their use of
confessory evidence.'5' Nor is it a difficult problem to instruct juries
on the basis of such an analysis. There is still a problem, however, as
to whether the state courts are in fact adhering to the United States
Supreme Court's present definition of "involuntary."
The Supreme Court has decided thirty-four state confession cases
in the last twenty-seven years, 152 an average of slightly more than one
case per year. The state supreme courts decide at least fifty such cases
each year.153 One would therefore presume that, with such a wealth
151. An analogous issue of voluntariness arises when a contract is attacked as having
been procured under duress. Yet state courts have been determining this state of mind
for almost a century. Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 Pac. 996 (1931); Barry
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 59 N.Y. 587, 591 (1875); Galusha v. Sherman, 105
Wis. 263, 81 N.W. 495 (1900). See also note 30 supra; authorities cited note 125
supra.
152. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 525 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
153. A search of the West digests (under Key numbers Criminal Law 519 and
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of experience in defining "involuntary," the state courts would have
developed a viable definition.
In state criminal cases the admissibility of confessions is usually
considered at three different times: by the trial judge, by the jury, and
by the appellate courts.154 First, the trial judge must decide whether
the confession must be excluded as a matter of law. If this is not
necessary, the jury next must consider both the legal and factual issues
in determining voluntariness. The trial judge controls this considera-
tion by his instructions to the jury on the point, and he should direct
the jury to disregard the confession if they find that it was involun-
tarily given.155 If the defendant is convicted, the appellate courts may
be asked to review the use of the confession and again the issues
are whether it should have been excluded as a matter of law,156 and
whether the instructions to the jury were correct.
5 7
Thus the jury considers the voluntariness of the confession once,
measuring voluntariness by the directions in the trial judge's instruc-
tions. Judges rule on the issue of voluntariness twice, but consider only
whether the confession was inadmissible as a matter of law.15B If the
trial judge's instructions or the standards used by the judges in re-
solving the legal issue are either incorrect or obscure, the defendant's
interests are not sufficiently protected. Any review of state cases will
reveal both incorrectness and obscurity in both trial court instructions
and appellate court standards. 5 9 Such a review will also reveal many
cases in which both clear and correct standards have been applied.
As to trial court instructions, the jury will typically be told to dis-
Constitutional Law 266) for the last two years reveals approximately one hundred
such decisions. Not all the confession cases are catalogued under either of these
headings, however, as is shown by the omission of the leading California case on the
subject, People v. Kendrick, supra note 120.
154. Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317 (1954). This arrangement is used in states
adhering to either the "New York view" or the "Massachusetts view," which com-
prise the predominant number of courts. Under the "orthodox view," the jury is
not consulted.
155. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). If the only instruction to the jury
is to disregard the confession if they find it untrustworthy, the instruction is reversible
error. Ibid. Whether this decision requires abandonment of the "orthodox view" is
still undecided.
156. See the discussion in Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WAsa. & LEE L. REv. 35, 58-61 (1962), of the prob-
lems created by the Stein decision when this simple point was overlooked.
157. Rogers v. Richmond, supra note 155.
158. Ritz, supra note 156, at 57-58. Thus, all conflicting evidence as to the de-
fendant's treatment during interrogation will be resolved in favor of the prosecution
following a guilty verdict.
159. In the notes following, it should be noted that most citations are from the
years 1961 through 1963. This is after the decisions in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961), Rogers v. Richmond, supra note 155, and Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961), which announced the Court's present standard.
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regard a confession "if same was made under promise of reward, or
was induced by threats, or was otherwise involuntary." 10 Such an
instruction has two primary faults. First, it connects "involuntary"
so closely to promises or threats that the jury may easily believe that
this is the only way in which confessions may be coerced. This would
mean that the defendant is being protected only by the common law
untrustworthiness standard, and that his additional due process pro-
tection has been lost. Secondly, if "involuntary" is not so tied to
promises and threats, the single word, standing alone, is probably not
sufficiently meaningful to the jury. Substantial explanation of this
concept would seem imperative if this is a major argument in the
defendant's case. Nor can the state courts maintain that there has
been no such explanation available, for the Supreme Court has con-
sidered and seemingly approved an instruction which further defined
the concept:
The trial court charged the jury that it could not consider a confession
unless it was voluntaky; that the jury was the sole judge of voluntariness;
and that a confession was not voluntary when obtained by any kind of
violence, abuse, or threat, or by "any coaxing, cajoling, or menacing influ-
ence which induces in the mind of the defendant the belief or hope that
he will gain some advantage by making a confession."
161
Other state courts have also formulated instructions which contained
expanded definitions of involuntary.162 This much explanation would
seem to be the minimum requirement to allow jury determination to
be a meaningful protection of the defendant. Still better would be an
instruction which advised the jury of the nature of the right of non-
disclosure, the constitutional interests protected by its promulgation,
160. In re Pates Petition, 371 P.2d 500, 504 (Okla. Crim. 1962). Other examples
include: "[T]be State must prove that [the confession] was freely and voluntarily
made and that it was not obtained by force or by a promise or threat or inducement."
Jones v. State, 229 Md. 165, 174, 182 A.2d 784, 788 (1962). "If you believe ...
that the said purported statement was not freely and voluntarily made ... or that
same was made as a result of coercion, compulsion or force .... ." Collins v. State,
supra note 142, at 846. A confession is admissible, "except when made under the
influence of fear produced by threats." WAsH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 10.58.030 (1961),
approved in State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d 598, 607, 364 P.2d 527, 532 (1961), but
disapproved in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). Nor has the sole use
of the untrustworthiness standard disappeared from instructions: "Was the inducement
held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession?"
State v. Nelson, 139 Mont. 180, 362 P.2d 224 (1961). See also State v. Cross, 357
S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1962).
161. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 189 (1952).
162. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 835, 113 N.W.2d 303, 307 (1962):
"The trial court properly instructed the jury . .. the confession could not be con-
sidered by them unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt the statements contained
in the alleged confession .. .were made by the defendant voluntarily uninfluenced by
fear, deception, promise, or artifice."
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and thereby explained the reasons behind their being asked to dis-
regard reliable evidence.
The state appellate courts do review the admission of confessions
into evidence, usually considering the facts surrounding the obtaining
of these statements. Thus they do not rely entirely upon any jury de-
cision as to voluntariness, but at least review the trial judge's decision
to let the jury hear the confession. 63 In such review, the important
question is: What standard is the court using to measure voluntariness?
The answer to this question varies from state to state. Some state
courts do seek to determine whether or not the defendant's will was
overborne and base this determination upon his probable state of mind
at the time he confessed. 6 4 Other state courts, however, give a very
limited review of voluntariness problems, seeking only to determine
whether the facts in the case before them are on all fours with the facts
in any of the cases reversed by the United States Supreme Court. If
the instant case does not "color-match" any of the Court's decisions, it
is automatically affirmed.165
Even in those courts which do not color-match cases, appellate re-
view may be extremely limited. The cases show three major types of
such limitations. (1) Some state appellate courts still regard threats
or promises as the only methods of obtaining involuntary confessions
and disregard the coercive effect of any other tactics.166 This outlook
163. Cf. State v. Harriott, 248 Iowa 25, 79 N.W.2d 332 (1956); State v. Ellis, 354
Mo. 998, 193 S.W.2d 31 (1946).
164. Kasinger v. State, 234 Ark. 788, 354 S.W.2d 718 (1962); State v. Traub, 150
Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962); People v. Meiquist, 26 Ill. 2d 22, 185 N.E.2d 825
(1962); State v. Fauntleroy, 36 N.J. 379, 177 A.2d 762 (1961). See also Hollman
v. State, 361 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. 1962); Ebert v. State, 140 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1962);
State v. Archer, supra note 135; State v. Floyd, 223 S.C. 413, 76 S.E.2d 291 (1953).
165. Such an attitude may be shown by many different shades of language: "None
of the [United States Supreme Court] cases cited have facts and circumstances on
all fours with those in the present case and, in our opinion, they are not here con-
trolling." Collins v. State, supra note 142, 352 S.W.2d 845. "There was no evidence
of protracted questioning leading up to the making of the confession, nor the use
of any high powered lights or similar devices ....... Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d
662, 665 (Ala. 1963). "In the instant case, the record does not demonstrate ...that
defendant was: held incommunicado for an extended period of time; questioned
continuously and/or in relays; denied food or drink; critically deprived of his capacity
for self-determination; or denied the presence and advice of counsel." State v. Keating,
61 Wash. 2d 452, 456, 378 P.2d 703, 705 (1963). Nor is the federal judiciary immune.
"The facts in each [of several Supreme Court cases previously cited] are clearly
distinguishable from the facts before this court." Smith v. Heard, 214 F. Supp. 909,
912 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
166. See, e.g., State v. Lasby, 174 A.2d 323 (Del. 1961); Bauer v. Commonwealth,
364 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1963); State v. McAllister, 244 La. 42, 150 So. 2d 557 (1963);
State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1961); State v. Cross, supra note 160.
Cf. the following statement by a Texas court: "The facts ...entitled the appellant,
in addition to the submission of threats and duress, to a distinct submission of whether
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gives the defendant only that protection which he had at common
law, and denies him the due process protection added by the Court.1 7
Under such reasoning, lack of warning, denial of counsel, failure to
provide food,16 and even compulsory stripping of the accused 6 9 have
been held irrelevant to the issue of coercion. (2) The effect of ex-
tended detention and questioning on the accused's state of mind is
also usually disregarded. Instead of examining the anxiety created by
such tactics, the courts look only to the propriety of the police con-
duct. 70 (3) Many of these problems arise because of over-reliance
the statement was made without compulsion or persuasion." Odis v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 107, 109-10, 345 S.W.2d 529, 531 (1961).
167. See text following note 160 supra. In some cases the protection is even less
than at common law, because of excessively restricted definitions of "threats." See, e.g.,
People v. Stoner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 108, 22 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1962); Ralph v. State, 226
Md. 840, 174 A.2d 163 (1961). But see People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. App. 2d 629, 364
P.2d 845 (1961). In each case, compare Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
But more especially, compare these decisions to Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897), and to the language therein quoted from state court opinions. Id. at 557-59.
If any state police interrogator feels that the Court is now over-restrictive of his prac-
tices, he should read Brain once, and then ponder how he would practice his calling if
the Court should return to that definition of "involuntary."
In other cases, common sense is ignored, and threats against persons other than the
accused himself are held irrelevant. See, e.g., People v. Kendrick, supra note 120;
People v. Curley, 114 Cal. App. 2d 577, 250 P.2d 667 (1952); Jones v. State, 229 Md.
165, 182 A.2d 784 (1962); Pate v. State, 361 P.2d 1086 (Okla. Crim. 1061); State
v. Keating, supra note 165; cf. People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 354 P.2d 231 (1960).
But consider the problem facing the police when family or friends of the accused are
suspected of being accessories after the fact. If they wish to prosecute the accessory
charge, how may they investigate? See In re Pate's Petition, supra note 160; cf. People
v. Rand, 202 Cal. App. 2d 668, 21 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1962).
168. See, e.g., Jones v. State, supra note 167; State v. Bridges, 349 S.W.2d 214
(Mo. 1961); State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188 A.2d 10 (1963); Commonwealth v.
Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962); Lopez v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 317, 366
S.W.2d 587 (1963); Fernandez v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 68, 353 S.W.2d 434 (1962).
'These factors were held irrelevant because defendant had made no request for the item
denied. Certainly such failures need not be determinative of the case, but they do
have an impact on the accused's state of mind. See Haynes v. Washington, supra
note 167.
169. Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 199 Pa. Super. 599, 187 A.2d 185 (1962). This
factor was held irrelevant because it did not "shock the conscience" of the court.
170. Typical of such an outlook is the statement: "As to the questioning of de-
fendant before arraignment, this is permissible in Delaware. . . .And even if the
purpose of the questioning is to secure a statement, the test of admissibility remains
whether or not there is a reasonable probability that it was obtained by improper meth-
ods." State v. Lasby, supra note 166, at 326. (Emphasis added.) This outlook allows
courts to hold that twenty-seven days of illegal detention and interrogation have no causal
connection to a confession made at the end of that time. Lopez v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 552, 352 S.W.2d 106 (1961). Nor have twelve hours of continuous questioning.
Bauer v. Commonwealth, supra note 166. Nor does the combined use of lengthy
detention and continuous periods of interrogation receive greater recognition. See, e.g.,
Dawson v. State, 139 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1962) (seven day detention, four to eight hours
of questioning per day). "[A] confession is not vitiated by the fact that it was made
while in custody after interrogation, provided the questioning was orderly and properly
conducted." Id. at 411. (Emphasis added.) See also Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424,
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upon state-created safeguards which are not related to the Court's
present standard. Individual states have created many express rules
for determining the admissibility of confessions. These rules may be
either more1' 1 or less'72 protective of a particular aspect of the accused's
rights than the Court's standard, but they do not protect the same
due process rights that the involuntariness standard does. Once such
a rule has been developed, there is a pronounced tendency to rely
upon that rule exclusively and disregard all other facets of the
problem. 173 However, since the state safeguards do not seek to enforce
the right to refuse to disclose guilt, they are insufficient when so used.
These self-imposed limitations on state appellate review do not
66 So. 2d 552 (1963). Yet it is obvious that such treatment affects the accused's state
of mind, and therefore must be considered relevant. See note 135 supra.
171. See, e.g., People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451, 226 N.Y.S.2d 404
(1961), where a refusal to answer an accused's questions as to his rights to remain
silent and to consult counsel was held sufficient to require exclusion of the resulting
confession. TFX. CODE Canv. PRoc. ANN. art. 727 (1941) requires that an arrestee be
warned for his confession to be admissible. These safeguards do not supplant the
due process requirement of excluding involuntary confessions, however, because they
each look at only one facet of the treatment of the accused, not at the total circum-
stances affecting his state of mind. The rules of McNabb and Messiah, supra note 111,
also fall into this category.
172. Some states provide rules which offer less protection than the common law
did. One example is a statute which permits use of confessions obtained by certain
kinds of threats or promises. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1607 (1956); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 10.58.030 (1961). But see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). Another
device is to have the confession itself state that it is voluntary. See Britt v. State, 242
Ind. 606, 180 N.E.2d 235 (1962). But see Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Still other rules find their potential protective ability reduced to insignificance by
judicial construction. One example is Kentucky's "anti-sweating" statute, Ky. R.v. STAT.
§ 422.110 (1961), which prohibits the police from "obtaining information from the
accused . . . by plying him with questions," and requires the exclusion of all con-
fessions so obtained. After judicial construction, this language now offers little protec-
tion against being "plied with questions." "[I]t would have to be established that the
confession was secured by threats, coercion or other wrongful means." Bauer v.
Commonwealth, supra note 166. Thus twelve hours of continuous interrogation will
not invalidate a confession. Ibid. Nor will detention for ten days. Reed v. Common-
wealth, 312 Ky. 214, 226 S.W.2d 513 (1949). Whether or not such treatment is
"wrongful," it does seem to constitute "plying with questions."
Another example is the adoption by the Michigan Supreme Court of the McNabb-
Mallory rule for use in criminal trials in that state. The rule was subsequently
modified, however, and perhaps negated. As presently construed, only confessions
which have been caused by the illegal detention must be excluded. People v. Harper,
365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808 (1962). Although this causal requirement has not
yet been interpreted, the experience of other states is enlightening. For example, Texas
has for many years had a rule identical to the latter formulation, without notably en-
hancing the protection of individuals against interrogation abuses. Thus, in Texas,
there is "no causal connection" between twenty-seven days of illegal detention and a
subsequent confession, and so the confession is admissible. Lopez v. State, supra note
170. Such a result hardly conforms to the spirit of McNabb-Mallory.
173. See notes 171-72 supra, and Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent
Developments in Cases Reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current
Problems, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 202, 223 (1962); see also State v. Green, 221 La.
713, 60 So. 2d 208 (1952); compare LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:452 (1950).
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indicate that the state courts are actively refusing to grant to de-
fendants the protection required by the Supreme Court. They do,
however, show a misunderstanding of the Court's present standard
and of the purposes behind the Court's decisions. Most of these
limitations may be traced to an attempted use of the objective
standard. Under it, only the conduct of the police need be considered,
so attempted color-matching of cases becomes quite proper. Also, only"outrageous" or "uncivilized" police conduct is objectionable under
that standard, so many coercive police tactics can be ignored, or at
least condoned, if they have been in use for a long time. These
limitations on state appellate review do not, therefore, mean that the
state courts are unwilling to follow the decisions of the Supreme
Court. They do mean that the Court's present position is not
understood by the state courts. It is thus the Court's duty to make
clear its present definition of "involuntary," primarily by explicitly
stating the purpose it seeks to achieve and the interests of the indi-
vidual accused it seeks to protect by excluding confessions.
V. CONCLUSION
Any definition of the term "involuntary" must be based on the
purposes underlying the exclusion of involuntary confessions. At
common law, the only reason for excluding confessions was to prevent
the use of untrustworthy testimony. This rationale protects the ac-
cused only if the interrogation tactics are sufficiently coercive to
induce a false self-accusation. The Supreme Court, however, has
under due process granted the accused broader protection which does
not depend on the untrustworthiness of the confession. The com-
mentators have suggested that the purpose of this additional due
process protection is to protect the accused from "outrageous" police
conduct. But this is not so, for the Court has excluded convictions
when the police conduct has not been outrageous; and in some cases
evidence about the type of person making the confession is considered
to be more important than evidence concerning police misconduct.
Further, the Court has always characterized its determination of in-
voluntariness as one involving an examination of the accused's state of
mind. These actions of the Court indicate that it is using a subjective
definition of "involuntary," and one which is based on protecting a
due process right of even the "guilty" accused to refuse to disclose his
guilt to a police interrogator. This right to remain silent is similar to,
but not derived from, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. One was devised to protect against the ancient abuse




The protection of an individual's right of non-disclosure does not,
however, mean that the police may not question an arrestee to obtain
information. Every man is supposed to have some ability to remain
silent in the face of routine questioning. Nor is the fact that there have
been violations of other due process rights reliable evidence of in-
voluntariness. Thus the police may use the investigative tool of
interrogation to a limited extent. They may question the accused,
after arrest, and may even use some pressure tactics for a limited time
to persuade him to confess. They may not, however, increase these
pressures to the point that the accused, even if guilty, feels that they
will insist upon a confession before easing the pressures. The question
in each case is whether the accused's will to remain silent has been
overcome by the interrogation. This is usually said to occur when
further resistance to the interrogator seems unavailing. Whether this
point has been reached or not must be decided on a case-by-case
basis, because a probable state of mind is being determined.
The state courts are quite capable of deciding such issues at both
the trial and the appellate court levels. However, their decisions in
coerced confession cases show that many of them are not using the
Court's present standard. In most instances, this can be traced to a
misconception of the objective of the present rule. A clear explanation
of that objective by the Court would enable the state courts to follow
the present standard. There are special reasons for both the state
courts and the state police to adhere to that standard. Continued fail-
ure to follow that standard will require greater federal court participa-
tion in such cases. It will also show that the present involuntariness
rule used by some state courts cannot be relied upon to effectively
protect the rights of accused persons in criminal trials. If the involun-
tariness rule does not provide effective protection, a stricter and more
mechanical rule would be required. One such rule, the McNabb-
Mallory rule, is available, as are arguments for its constitutional
necessity.174 But, because of McNabb-Mallory's inadequacies, this
would be a poor resolution of the competing interests involved. There-
fore, it is to be hoped that the states will not jeopardize their present
limited authority to interrogate, but will restrict their use of confes-
sions to those obtained without violation of the right to refuse to
disclose guilt.
174. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L.
BEv. 483, 564-94 (1963). See also text at notes 112-21.
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